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INTRODUCTION
At the tenth anniversary of German unification, on October 3, 2000, little pretense was made about the
economic situation in eastern Germany, the (promised) "Wirtschaftswunder" that did not happen. For the
economic catch-up process in the East had already stalled a number of years ago: over recent years the new
eastern Länder grew at an even slower pace than the old western ones. This is all the more remarkable for
the fact, but may not be altogether unrelated to it, that western  Germany's economic performance over the
1990s was outstandingly dismal: real GDP growth since 1992 averaged a meager 1.5 percent, and the
unemployment rate nearly doubled as roughly 1.5 million jobs (or five percent of the labor force) were lost in
western Germany until the end of 1997. 
This paper does not concern itself with the disappointing economic developments in the new eastern Länder
(see Akerlof et. al. 1991, Sinn and Sinn 1992, Heilemann and Jochimsen 1993, Hölscher and Stephan 1998,
Sinn 2000, for instance). Rather, its objective is to investigate the causes of western Germany's remarkably
poor performance since 1992. A widely held view on this issue seems to be that problems originating in the
East proved contagious: the prior economic powerhouse West Germany seems to have been brought to its
knees by the "burden" that the collapsing former East Germany presented to it. This "burden" of unification
was most visible and most widely felt in the form of the drastic deterioration in public finances over the
1990s: a sharply rising tax burden, stagnating public consumption and falling public investment, and - in the
context of the Maastricht "convergence criteria" the perhaps greatest public concern of all - protracted
budget deficits and a steep increase in public indebtedness. Assessing the "trends in public sector debt since
unification," the Bundesbank reaches the following conclusion that would seem to summarize well the German
conventional wisdom on this issue:
Public debt has soared since the beginning of the nineties, mainly because of the fiscal
consequences of German unification. Although part of the expenditure incurred in integrating
the new Länder was financed by raising taxes and social security contributions and by cutting
spending, particularly in the case of the Federal Government, substantial recourse was had to
borrowing. However, increasing government indebtedness, as a partial response to the massive
challenge posed by unification, is justifiable only for a limited period. Otherwise, there is a danger
that the state might fall into a debt trap in which the budget deficit and the accumulated debt
level become self-fueling as a result of the rapidly growing interest payment burdens. In order to
avoid such a development, the adopted course of fiscal consolidation has to be strictly
maintained (Bundesbank 1997, p. 17). 
This paper challenges the view that the marked deterioration in public finances since unification, and western
Germany's exceptionally poor performance more generally, might be largely attributed to unification.
Specifically, this paper challenges the view, implicit in the Bundesbank's above assessment, that the rise in
public indebtedness reflects that the virtuous course of fiscal consolidation might have been adopted either
belatedly or not firmly enough. Instead, it is argued here that ill-timed and inexplicably tight fiscal policies in
conjunction with tight monetary policies of an exceptional length and degree caused the severe and
protracted de-stabilization of western Germany in the first place. The key result is that Germany's dismalrecent record must not be seen as a direct and apparently inevitable result of unification, but as the
perfectly unnecessary consequence of stability-oriented macro policies conducted under the Bundesbank's
dictate. 
The analysis begins with a discussion of the economic and budgetary starting position of West Germany over
1988-90 and a preliminary assessment of the magnitude of the fiscal challenge posed by unification. The fact
is that western Germany coped rather smoothly with the initial shock: real GDP grew strongly from 1988
through 1991 at low and stable - marked-determined - inflation, while the budget deficit rose by 3 percent
only although few measures were undertaken initially to prevent any rise in borrowing. Section 3 investigates
the sustainability issue of public finances. It is shown that unification posed no immediate  risk of unstable
debt dynamics, while any need for medium-term  fiscal consolidation was rather limited too. The analysis
then turns to the conduct of fiscal and monetary policies in sections 4 and 5 respectively. It is shown that
Germany embarked on fiscal consolidation in a pro-cyclical and inexplicably aggressive way, which was not only
in conflict with economic theory but also with the best practices observed in other more successful
countries. In addition, the Bundesbank imposed tight money of an exceptional length and degree, magnifying
rather than compensating the depressive effects of fiscal policy. Section 6 then estimates some of the
fiscal consequences of sluggish growth due to the deflationary policy mix that has proved so highly
counterproductive by causing Germany's dismal performance; while section 7 offers some final thoughts on
the actual fiscal burden of unification. It is found that roughly one third of the actual rise in Germany's debt
ratio (as well as a limited rise in the tax burden) may be properly attributed to unification, rather than the
unsound macro policies pursued in response to it. Section 8 concludes.
GERMANY ON THE EVE OF UNIFICATION AND THE ENSUING FISCAL PARADOX OF THE 1990s
Before assessing the soundness of the policy response to unification, both the initial state of the economy
and the order of magnitude of the fiscal implications of unification need to be discussed. Truly, any
assessment of subsequent developments over the 1990s must be impressed by the favorable economic
shape of West Germany as the happy event arose. After having grown rather sluggishly ever since the
1981-2 recession, growth picked up markedly toward the end of the decade: GDP grew at 3.7 and 3.6 per
cent in 1988 and 1989 respectively, almost double the pace of previous years. Not only exports were
performing strongly, traditionally relied upon by Germany for igniting demand-led growth. Fiscal and monetary
policies too contributed (belatedly) to the recovery in domestic demand: the income tax cuts of 1986 and
1988 were joined by an accommodative monetary stance until 1989. This policy-mix contrasted favorably
with the first half of the eighties when fiscal austerity was allied with the Bundesbank's failure to cut
interest rates in view of perceived "inflationary" risks due to exchange weakness; and economic activity thus
stabilized at persistently depressed levels of domestic demand. The year 1989, when the Berlin wall came
down, stands out as the finest year in a decade: non-inflationary and broadly-based GDP growth due to strong
domestic and foreign demand, yielding high employment growth and a balanced public budget, with a trade
surplus of 5 percent of GDP. (See Table 2.1.) 
In 1990, however, the world economic situation changed for the worse. And with a marked slowdown in growth
or even recession in both the US and parts of Europe, Germany's exports began to fall off sharply in the
second half of the year. In view of these external developments unification represented not just a challenge
(and responsibility) of getting former East Germany on track for a prosperous future. It was also a welcome
opportunity for West Germany to prevent sliding into recession as well (in fact, a great opportunity for
European growth). In this sense, then, the analysis of this paper concerns an unhappy story of missed
opportunities. 
Probably the most crucial root cause of the missing of this opportunity has to be seen in the fact that the
key player in German economic policy-making, the Bundesbank, never regarded the situation as an opportunity
for sustained growth, but primarily as a risk to price stability. This biased assessment was based on the
belief that West Germany's economy was already running at its full potential by 1989, and was thus at
serious danger of overheating and run-away inflation. 
This assessment was proved evidently wrong by subsequent developments though: western German real GDP
grew at a solid 5 percent rate in both 1990 and 1991. For one thing, one must not underestimate that the
economy had operated at persistently and significantly depressed levels throughout the eighties and still had
ample spare capacities by the end of the decade; particularly, unemployment was still above six per cent in1989. It is thus noteworthy that the strong employment growth seen in those years was rather evenly
distributed, including low-skill workers and long-term unemployed, that is, those habitually classified (and
written off) as structurally unemployed. Moreover, the influx of labor from behind the former iron curtain
provided important supply-side relief too, so that general labor market pressures proved anything but severe.
Pressures were high on western Germany's capital stock in these years. But it is not clear why inflationary
pressures should have been expected to arise from this side either. If anything, running the capital stock at a
high speed through rising machine hours and extra work shifts should boost profits and keep down average
costs due to economies of scale, in turn stimulating investment to expand capacities and introduce the latest
technologies. In actual fact, investment, potential output, and labor productivity grew very strongly in these
years, so that growth on the supply side was both strong and broadly based. (Again, contrasting favorably
with the trend of the eighties when weak demand and underutilized capacities made for slack investment and
capacity growth.)
Another pivotal fact is that Germany is not a closed economy. No doubt, Germany's free drawing on external
resources was welcomed by its trading partners, many of whom suffered from recessionary conditions at the
time. Under such conditions, any idea that an expansion of aggregate demand in Germany might run against
some kind of "saving constraint" was truly beside the point.
It was not very surprising, then, that western Germany's - allegedly fully employed - economy coped rather
smoothly with the strains that unification put on its resources: GDP growth over 1989-91 was not only
strong, but also non -inflationary.1 Producer price inflation remained stable at around 2 percent throughout
the period of strong growth, while headline CPI Inflation fell to 2.7 percent in 1990, slightly down from the
previous year's 2.8 percent; all perfectly in line with Germany's inflation trend over the 1980s.2 Headline CPI
inflation then picked up slightly in 1991 to 3.5 percent, peaking at 4.0 percent in 1992, and falling rather
sluggishly thereafter (back "below 2 percent" only by 1995). One important factor behind German price
developments at the time were strong rent increases. This reflected the praised natural working of market
forces in the housing market (due to strong immigration, in particular), and it is at least debatable whether
provoking a general slowdown in economic activity represents an adequate policy response to it. 
But another key factor was not even market, but wholly policy determined in the first place: rises in indirect
taxes and government-administered prices; providing us a first, most conspicuous indication of the
inconsistency of the policies pursued.3 For the critical rise in headline CPI inflation in 1991 was chiefly caused
by fiscal measures intended to reduce public borrowing requirements. Such attempts arose largely due to
mounting pressures from the Bundesbank, in particular, arguing that cuts in public borrowing would be
necessary in order to prevent  inflation.4 Yet, rather than preventing inflation, these very measures caused
inflation in the first place.5 In response, the 1991 rise in headline CPI inflation then provoked even tighter
money by the Bundesbank.
This remarkable policy inconsistency not only caused the initial rise in inflation over 1991-2, it was also
responsible for the sluggish fall in inflation thereafter. The deep recession of 1992-3 was critical in this
regard, as borrowing requirements soared and ever-new rounds of indirect tax and administered price rises
were implemented. These were intended to keep borrowing requirements low (and Bundesbank pressure at
bay), but caused  further "tax-push inflation"; developments which, in turn, discouraged the Bundesbank from
monetary easing on the one hand, but encouraged the Bundesbank's on-going pressures for fiscal
consolidation on the other (cf. Bibow 1998). This truly bizarre policy inconsistency had other far-reaching
consequences too, not least by provoking accelerating wage inflation. The analysis will therefore return to
this issue and the monetary policies of the Bundesbank in more detail in section 5 below. Before, however, a
closer look at the order of magnitude of the fiscal challenge posed by unification is in order.
Starting from a balanced budget in 1989, the budget swung into a near 3 percent deficit over 1990-1. Two
issues need to be kept separate here. One concerns the question of sustainability of budgetary positions, an
issue which will be taken up in section 3 below. Another issue is that the budget deficit, or the change therein,
does not provide any appropriate measure of the fiscal "burden" of unification, since the budget deficit is
merely a summary measure of fiscal policy and economic performance generally. Fiscal transfers provide a
more appropriate starting point for quantifying the fiscal implications of unification. But a number of
complications arise in this regard too. One complication is that (continuous) flows  of current transfers-- and their financing--have to be kept
separate from, what may be properly seen as, "inherited debts." The nature of the latter is to raise the debt
[-to-GDP] ratio through one-off stock adjustments . And this will also tend to raise the interest service on
the debt. The magnitude of this factor will be estimated in section 7 below. But more pertinent for assessing
the fiscal effects on economic activity and the overall budgetary position are current transfer flows. It is
through their effect on the budgetary position that current transfers are also relevant to the issues of
sustainability and fiscal consolidation. 
Official estimates by the German Finance Ministry (see Deutscher Bundestag 1998, 2000) put fiscal
transfers in the order of magnitude of some DM 180 billion in each year since 1991, or roughly 6.5 percent of
western German GDP. This figure is the sum of all unification-related expenditures and tax reliefs and hence
not a correct measure of fiscal "transfers" though. An estimate of transfers (from West to East) proper
may be derived by deducting federal revenues in eastern  Germany from the above "gross" figure. Official
estimates put "net" transfers in the order of magnitude of DM 120-140 billion in each year since 1991,
amounting to roughly 4.5 percent of western German GDP (see table 2.2). Clearly unification posed a
formidable fiscal challenge, not an unsurmountable challenge though, as it is also brought into perspective
here that East Germany was a fairly small country compared to the economic giant to its west.6 
Beware that "net transfers" do not provide an accurate measure of borrowing requirements arising due to
unification. As it also needs to be taken into account that (gross) fiscal transfers benefitted public finances
in western  Germany through second-round (or multiplier effects) too, either directly by raising "exports" to
the eastern German Länder, or indirectly by raising incomes in Germany's proper export markets. This may
not be measurable with any degree of precision. But one would expect actual borrowing requirements to fall
considerably short of DM 120-140 billion.7
The overall budget deficit for the year 1991 of only  DM 85 billion or 2.9 per cent of GDP certainly confirmed
this expectation. The swing from balance to a 2.9 percent deficit between 1989 and 1991 reflected the joint
effects of mainly three factors: first, reduced revenues attributable to the income tax reform of 1990 of
some DM 40 billion8, second, increased revenues attributable to increases in tax and social security
contribution rates in 1991 of some DM 25 billion and, third, (net) fiscal transfers attributable to unification
of some DM 106 billion. 
Note here that initially  measures aimed at financing the "burden" of unification other than through borrowing
were introduced at a limited scale only. For one thing, this deliberate recourse to public borrowing
represented the only practicable short-term policy option anyhow. More importantly, the chosen policy for
coping with the fiscal exigency of unification was also well in line with one of the oldest economic doctrines
around, that if "an immediate and great expence must be incurred in [any] moment of immediate danger,
which will not wait for the gradual and slow returns of the new taxes ... government can have no other
resources but in borrowing" (Smith 1776). 
Keynesian reservations on deficit spending were clearly not applicable to the situation at hand, as the above
analysis has already shown. Keynes's (1939) recommendation to increase taxes as a means of restraining
aggregate demand referred to the prospective British war economy, which he envisioned to be literally fully
employed and, moreover, largely cut-off from external resources. The Germany of 1990 and after was far
from such exceptional war-time conditions. 
Nonetheless, starting in 1992, and under mounting pressures from the Bundesbank, the rudder of German
fiscal policy was turned hard right. After two years of significant expansionary stimuli effects9, which in a
rather timely and counter-cyclical mode had prevented Germany from participating in the recession
experienced in large parts of the world at that time, the German government began to introduce ever new
fiscal measures with the aim of cutting its borrowing requirements.10 A study by Heilemann and Rappen
(1997) estimates that by 1995 the total effect of expenditure savings and increases in tax and social
security contribution rates introduced meanwhile was sufficient to "finance" almost the whole of gross  [sic!]
fiscal transfers of DM 180 billion. 
Thus, a glaring fiscal paradox  emerges at this point. Up to 1991, it had been deliberately left to borrowing totake up almost the whole of the fiscal brunt of unification. Then, between 1992 and 1995, a cumulative fiscal
tightening occurred that was even far in excess of the high plateau of net fiscal transfers of some DM
120-140 billion per annum reached at that time and subsequently maintained for the rest of the decade; with
tax and social security rates rising and government consumption and investment spending stagnating or even
falling (see Table 2.2). And yet, by 1996, Germany's deficit ratio stood at 3.4 percent, that is, well above the
initial level of 1991.
Clearly, something must have gone seriously wrong. I will offer a resolution to Germany's fiscal paradox of the
1990s further below. But before the analysis needs to address the sustainability issue of whether unification
might have posed any risk of unstable debt dynamics and what degree of fiscal consolidation might have been
required to (re-) attain a sustainable public finance position.
THE ISSUE OF SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC FINANCES: THEORY AND GERMAN EXPERIENCE OVER THE
1990s
Public concern about the public debt is closely related to the idea that rising public indebtedness implies rising
taxes required to service the debt. It is thus vital to appreciate that in a growing  economy a rising tax rate
may not  be required to service a growing debt. Although budget deficits - self-evidently - add to the
absolute  amount of the debt, and although the public debt stays on an ever-rising trend in absolute terms,
this may be sustainable indefinitely  and not involve any relative  rise in the tax burden on account of the
debt on tax payers. In short, even permanent deficits do not  necessarily pose a risk of unstable debt
dynamics resulting from a unsustainable fiscal position. 
Evsey Domar's (1944) seminal essay on the "burden of debt" established the following: an economy growing at
some constant rate, g , and with the government borrowing the same constant deficit ratio, def , in each
period, the debt ratio, d , will not explode but gradually approach a constant of size def /g . Neither will the
tax rate required to service the debt explode but approach a constant of size def /g  * i ; where i  is the
rate of interest paid on public bonds (for simplicity assumed to be tax-exempt). Hence, while a complete
collapse of GDP growth implies a clear risk of debt explosion, the higher GDP growth, the lighter the burden of
debt. Domar (1944, p. 822) concluded that "the problem of the debt burden is essentially a problem of
achieving a growing national income." 
Luigi Pasinetti (1998a, b, 2000) proposed a definition of sustainability of public finances that renders this
notion operational and applicable to specific economic situations. Public finances are judged sustainable  as
long as the public debt grows at a rate equal to or smaller than the nominal GDP growth rate, that is, whether
the following condition is satisfied: 
d t   d 0
Pasinetti's approach to the issue is attractive for a number of reasons. First of all, it deliberately excludes
the issue of optimality of some debt ratio, as economic theory has nothing definite to say on this anyway.
Essentially, his definition "accepts" the debt ratio at t0, whatever it may be, as given and concentrates on
whether the current budgetary position may be maintained indefinitely without leading to a rise in the debt
ratio started from. (If, for whatever reason, the initial debt ratio is considered "wrong," this definition still
provides a benchmark to evaluate whether the debt ratio is changing in the desired direction.) Next, the
proposed definition moves the key issue to center stage: a stable debt ratio implies a stable tax burden, on
account of the debt, on tax payers; while a rising debt ratio implies a rising tax rate. In addition, it is made
clear that there is no specific deficit ratio either that may be generally regarded as sustainable, but one that
stabilizes a particular debt ratio at some particular rate of GDP growth. Accordingly, a sustainability
relation  between the deficit ratio and the debt ratio exists that features stability  of these parameters: 
def  = - g d . 
In fact, given the inequality sign featuring in the sustainability definition, the relation may actually be seen as
a "boundary relation" defining the "sustainability area": def    - g  d . A deficit ratio is judged sustainable as
long as it does not exceed the product of the GDP growth rate and the debt ratio. For in this case there will
be no tendency for either the debt ratio or the tax burden to rise. Clearly the overall situation crucially hinges
on the rate of GDP growth, and fig. 3.1. illustrates the effects of growth on the permissible deficit ratio fordebt ratios of 40 and 60% respectively.
Finally, it should be noted here that Pasinetti's definition of sustainability is in a certain sense very strict.
The sustainable position has to be already attained in the current period (which could then be maintained
forever). Alternative definitions of sustainability (cf. Blanchard et al 1991, Buiter 1985, Buiter et al 1993)
allow for more fiscal laxity in "the short term," as a current deficit judged unsustainable according to our
definition might be compensated for by more fiscal rectitude in future periods. And the longer the horizon,
the greater the leeway in this regard. Hence the definition chosen here combines the benefit of technical
simplicity with strictness of criteria.
I now turn to applying the chosen sustainability concept to Germany's public finance position as it evolved in
the period between 1988 and 2000. Figure 3.2. shows the evolution of both actual financial balances as well
as "maximum stability balances." The latter refers to the deficit ratio that would have been sustainable
indefinitely given the conditions prevalent in each period (i.e. the actual rates of nominal GDP growth and
actual debt ratios). The difference between the actual financial balances and the maximum stability balances
yields the "sustainability gap" (with a non-negative gap implying sustainable debt dynamics in the sense of a
non-rising debt ratio). Fig. 3.2 shows significant positive  gaps in the years up to 1992, then turning into
protracted negative gaps until 1997-8. 
An alternative debt scenario was included in fig. 3.2. featuring the Maastricht parameter of a 60% debt ratio
as the "target" level throughout. (According to the above relation def  = -gd , the combination of a 60% debt
ratio and a 3% deficit ratio implicitly assumes nominal GDP growth of 5%; if it is further assumed that the
random Maastricht criteria were at least meant to be internally consistent). A higher steady-state debt ratio
may be attained along different paths though. For instance, a temporarily enlarged room of fiscal manouevre
might be seen as a discretionary measure to re-ignite growth in case of cyclical slowdown. Also, stock
adjustments may change the debt ratio swiftly, either due to privatization or the assumption of "inherited"
debts (factors that played a role in Germany's case over the 1990s). For reasons to be further scrutinized
below Germany actually attained a debt ratio of 60% in the late nineties, starting from 40% at the beginning
of the decade. 
Table 3.1 summarizes the key result: unification per se did not pose any immediate risk of unstable debt
dynamics and unsustainable public finances. Rather, this problem only arose with the sharp recession of
1992-93, and it only abated with the (long-delayed) recovery in 1997-8. 
An alternative way to assess the sustainability of the public debt from which important additional insights
may be gained is to concentrate not on total budget balances, but on "primary" balances, defined net of
interest payments  on the public debt. Pasinetti (1998a,b) shows that another version of the above key
relation emerges between the primary deficit ratio and the debt ratio, crucially depending on the difference
between the interest rate and the growth rate. Interpreted as a boundary relation, the amended version
defines the sustainability area as
def p    (i  - g ) d . 
One important issue brought out by primary (rather than total) budget balances concerns the budgetary
implications that stem directly from the constellation between the rate of interest and the rate of GDP
growth of an economy. Another is that the budgetary implications of this constellation also depend on the
level of the debt ratio. As shown above, when starting from any constant debt ratio as the norm or target
level, the rate of GDP growth represents one key variable: the lower the rate of growth, the lower the
sustainable (total) budget deficit. The more specific point to note here is that the "burden of debt," i.e. the
tax rate required to pay the interest on the debt in particular, crucially hinges on the gap between the rate of
interest and the rate of growth (cf. also Pasinetti 1997). The greater this "growth spread," the greater the
primary  budget surplus needed for keeping any given debt ratio stable. When this crucial constellation
worsens, other public expenditures will have to be cut to keep the overall tax burden constant and the debt
ratio from rising. 
Figure 3.3 captures the sustainability question in terms of primary balances, broadly confirming the previous
result: a serious problem of unstable debt dynamics only arose with the sharp recession of 1992-93, and it
only abated with the recovery of 1997-8. Figure 3.4. shows the drastic worsening of the "anti-growth spread"arising during the recessionary period of 1992-7. Clearly, the driving factor behind the worsening of the
growth spread was the sharp and sustained drop in GDP growth in 1992-3. At that point, it seems, Germany
was pushed into a low-growth trap, with GDP growth stuck well below the (implicit) Maastricht parameter of
5% but a rate of interest anchored at sufficiently higher levels throughout. An unfavorable anti-growth
spread, in turn, tends to push the debt ratio on a rising trend. Table 3.2 summarizes these results.
A warning is in order here on treating the deficit and debt ratios, the rate of interest, and the rate of GDP
growth as apparently independent parameters. This might usefully highlight the role of the constellation
between the key parameters involved in assessing the sustainability of public finances. But the real problem
is that these magnitudes are not  independent of one another. In particular, a rise in the rate of interest not
only directly raises debt servicing costs. Most likely, it also impacts negatively on GDP growth. Similarly, if
budgetary attempts are then undertaken to cope with the rising interest burden and fiscal repercussions of
slower growth, by cutting public expenditures and/or raising tax rates, this is again likely to impact negatively
on GDP growth. A potential inherent instability  emerges here as a rising debt ratio itself makes matters still
worse, implying a rising interest burden. It is thus vital for successful consolidation to be alert to these
interdependencies and avoid disturbing any favorable constellation between the key parameters involved. 
A first intuition concerning Germany's fiscal paradox emerges here. Note that by 1997 the deficit had finally
fallen to 2.6 percent (after six years of consolidation efforts starting from a deficit ratio of 2.9 percent in
1991). Germany thus took the fateful Maastricht hurdle of 3.0 percent. But its debt ratio was still not falling,
but rising. For Germany's nominal GDP growth had meanwhile been forced down to 2.2 percent.11 Perhaps,
then, Domar's (1944) warning that choking off growth would not be the proper way to lighten the debt burden
had not been taken all that seriously.12 
Importantly, I do not wish to imply that real GDP growth of 4-5 percent, as achieved from 1988 to 1991,
could have been sustained indefinitely. Rather, the point is that a large positive  margin existed at that time.
Hence the true issue is whether the landslide recession of 1992-3 was inevitable, or a soft landing attainable.
The subsequent analysis modestly assumes that avoiding massive job losses in western Germany and
sustaining nominal GDP growth of 5 to 6 percent was both the order of the day and perfectly well achievable
by sound economic policies. 
In conclusion, given the situation in 1991, any need for fiscal consolidation in view of German unification was
small in medium-term perspective and non-existent for immediate concerns. For instance, if the 40% debt
ratio existing at the time were taken as the target, a 2.0 or 2.4% deficit ratio would have been sustainable at
5 or 6% nominal GDP growth respectively. Alternatively, if the 60% debt ratio actually achieved by the end of
the decade were taken as the target, the actual budget deficit of 1991 of less than 3 percent would have
been permissible even at 5 percent growth. Things turned out rather differently though. But why? Because of
unification? As already noted above, the world economic situation worsened sharply over 1990-1. And the
subsequent section 5 will show that the Bundesbank imposed ultra-tight money at just that time. The next
section inquires whether fiscal policy itself might have played any role in Germany's fiscal paradox of the
1990s.
AUTOMATIC STABILIZERS AND DISCRETIONARY DESTABILIZERS: THEORY AND GERMAN PRACTICE
The budget balance is an endogenous variable rather than a policy instrument proper, as public finances and
the economy are interdependent. On the one hand, fiscal policy affects the levels of aggregate demand and
economic activity. On the other hand, the state of the economy is a major influence on the budgetary
position. The notion of "automatic stabilizers" refers to the latter route of influence, i.e. the natural role of
the budget to passively reduce instability in the system through its passive cyclical movements. By contrast,
truly "discretionary" fiscal policy measures actively stimulate or retard aggregate demand through budgetary
means over and above what is merely a reflection of the economy's impact on the budget. The budget balance
may thus be decomposed as:
actual budged balance = f(output gap) + structural budget balance
The first part of the right hand side represents the cyclical balance, capturing the effects of automatic
stabilizers on the budget, while the structural balance is defined as that hypothetical budgetary stance whichcorresponds to potential output (or, a zero output gap). Correspondingly, a change  in the structural balance
is a measure of discretionary fiscal stimuli. The issue whether such discretion should be applied to actively
stabilize the economy remains controversial. But letting the budget breeze along with the economy is
universally considered as "sound finance." In fact, to behave otherwise would be in stark conflict with
economic theory (see e.g. Taylor 2000).
The previous section concluded that unification presented no immediate need for fiscal consolidation. Faced
with a sudden "shock," but also in view of the worsening world economy in 1990, the expansionary fiscal
stimuli over 1990-1 were in line with theory and represented a great opportunity for sustaining growth in
Germany (and Europe). This section assesses fiscal policy over the sustained recessionary period from 1992
to 1997, both in terms of theory and the best practices of countries that were more successful in
consolidating their public finances over this period. Both the US and the UK achieved budget surpluses toward
the end of the decade--implying falling absolute  levels of debt--achievements for which they received
widespread praise. 
Figure 4.1 shows the development of general government financial balances in these three countries between
1988 and 2000. The US started from a deficit ratio of more than 3 percent in 1989, the final year of the
long upswing of the 1980s. When, what turned out to be a fairly mild, recession hit in 1990 the deficit ratio
rose to nearly 6 percent by 1992.13 In 1992, the US economy bounced back and the long upswing of the
nineties affirmed itself, with fiscal balances starting to improve from 1993 onwards and running into surplus
by 1998. By comparison, the UK started from a far more favorable position, but when hit by severe recession
in 1990, fiscal balances dramatically turned from surplus into a 8 percent deficit by 1993. And yet, by 1998
the UK too again realized a budget surplus.14
The remarkable thing about Germany is that the deficit ratio stayed at the 1991 level of around 3 percent
until 1997. Only by 1997-98 public finances started to improve, ending the decade in a significantly worse
state than in the US and UK though.
The evolution of debt and interest expenditure ratios confirm this picture. Starting from a significantly lower
level, Germany overtook the US and UK in both respects (see figures 4.2. and 4.3). The rise in Germany's
indebtedness in the first half of the 1990s is to some  extent due to stock adjustments related to the
assumption of "inherited debts" (see below). But more important was the timing factor , as illustrated by
comparing the evolution of financial balances on a synchronized  basis. 
As Germany was clearly out-of-sync with the other two countries in the early 1990s, a comparison on a
synchronized basis seems imperative. Both the US and the UK were hit by recession in 1990, while Germany
was experiencing strong non-inflationary growth by that time. For reasons to be explored here, Germany then
fell into recession in 1992, at which time recovery was already taking hold again in both the US and UK. The
base year in Fig. 4.4, y0, therefore refers to 1990 in the case of the US and UK, but to 1992 in Germany's.
Accordingly, y +8 refers to 1998 in the case of the US and UK, but to the year 2000 in Germany's. Fig. 4.4
makes it clear that both the US and UK allowed their fiscal balances to deteriorate markedly when recession
hit. By contrast, Germany's deficit ratio fell slightly in 1992, as consolidation started, only to bounce back to,
and remaining stuck at, the pre-recession level in subsequent years of sluggish growth. Fiscal balances
started to improve again early and quickly in both the US and the UK. By pure accident?
Far from it. The crucial point, the timing factor, is made blatantly clear by concentrating on the
(synchronized) evolution of structural balances. As Fig. 4.5 shows, structural balances deteriorated together
with financial balances in both the UK and US. By contrast, Germany embarked on cutting structural deficits
in 1992, that is, at the onset of recession . 
It is quite clear then what must have happened to bring about the evolution of overall financial balances as
actually seen over the period: cyclical balances must have backfired severely in Germany's case.15 In fact, as
Fig. 4.6 shows, the US's cyclical balance deteriorated when the recession hit but quickly returned to positive
territory when the economy improved. By contrast, in Germany's case there is a protracted negative cyclical
contribution over the whole period. 
Calculations due to the German Council of Economic Experts16 shown in Fig. 4.7 confirm the timing factor.Marked reductions in structural balances were concentrated in those critical years between 1991-94, while
the overall financial deficit remained stuck at the same level until 1997. Privatization revenues then
contributed significantly toward "consolidation" in the years 1994-98. In fact, the positive turn in the budget
from 1996 to 1997 that allowed Germany to take the Maastricht 3.0 percent hurdle was largely due to faster
growth--spurred by export demand.
In conclusion, the analysis shows that Germany assumed a rather counterproductive route toward fiscal
consolidation. Given the important interdependency between the state of the economy and the state of public
finances, fiscal policy is far more likely to achieving its ends by behaving in a stabilizing rather than
de-stabilizing way, namely by conducting its affairs in a counter-cyclical rather than a pro-cyclical mode (cf.
Horn and Scheremet 1999). Unfortunately, and despite the fact of starting from a very favorable fiscal
position, the German authorities ignored economic theory. But German fiscal conduct was also in conflict with
the best practices of other more successful countries. Comparing the German experience with the US and
UK's, and even leaving monetary policy out of the picture at this stage, I feel therefore justified to presume
that Germany too could have achieved a more favorable economic performance over the 1990s--if only more
intelligent fiscal policies had been pursued, policies more in line rather than in conflict with economic
theory.17 
MONETARY POLICY AND THE ROLE OF THE BUNDESBANK
But monetary policy cannot be left out of the picture. In fact, the timing factor is not only relevant for sound
fiscal policy, but even more so for achieving a sound policy mix. For even with sound fiscal policies any
economy may easily become unstuck if monetary policy does not play its part too; effective coordination
between fiscal and monetary policies is crucial to the overall outcome. So if fiscal consolidation is the
declared goal, as decided in Maastricht in 1991, it is not only required that fiscal policy is conducted in line
with theory and avoids the kind of blunders seen in Germany over the nineties. There is also a clear need for
monetary policy to sufficiently counterbalance any deflationary effects coming through from planned  fiscal
consolidation. Otherwise it becomes even more likely that consolidation fails ex post as the destabilized
economy backfires on public finances. 
As I have dealt with the Bundesbank's stability-oriented monetary policies of the 1990s extensively elsewhere
(see Bibow 1998, 2000), a brief summary of some of the main facts must suffice here. Fig. 5.1 shows the
(synchronized) monetary policy response to the recession of the early 1990s by the US Fed and the
Bundesbank, respectively. When recession hit in the US, the Fed quickly reduced the real short-term rate of
interest that it controls to around 1 percent, and when that proved insufficient to kick-start the economy, it
was cut further to around zero. The Fed continued its ultra-easy money policy until the economy bounced
back to life; at which point stance was set to neutral. By contrast, the Bundesbank's ultra-tight stance
established on the eve of unification peaked as the economy cracked, and subsequent cuts were
extraordinarily sluggish.18 
No serious economist denies that restrictive monetary policy has largely real effects in "the short run."19
Another key factor we need to appreciate then is that these (allegedly) "short-run" real effects may come to
last for rather long when tight money is exercised for long enough. The "monetary conditions index"20 of Fig.
5.2 shows that the Bundesbank hang on to the ultra-tight stance established in late 1989 for the subsequent
six years! Until spring 1996, its extraordinarily sluggish interest rate cuts, starting in autumn 1992 and only
reaching their (temporary) trough by mid-1996, were fully offset by DM appreciation. The real consequences
of this not quite so short run of ultra-tight money were as theory would predict, and well reflected by the
depressed level of capacity utilization included in Fig. 5.221 It is clear then that the Bundesbank's ultra-tight
money stance established in 1990 and maintained for the subsequent six years were far from compensating,
but grossly magnified  the deflationary consequences of fiscal consolidation embarked on in 1992.
While the glaring facts of this doubly-counterproductive policy mix can hardly be denied conventional wisdom
seems to hold that these policies were inevitable . They were inevitable because unification posed a threat of
run-away inflation and unstable debt dynamics, and because of Germany's rigid labor markets. It is thus
worthwhile to compare consumer price and wage trends in Germany and the US and return to the policy
inconsistency pointed out in section 2 above. To begin with, it seems rather striking that the allegedly rigid and structurally inferior (West) German
economy delivered GDP growth rates of 3.7, 3.6, 5.0, and 5.0 percent in the years from 1988 to 1991, at low
and stable - market-determined! - inflation. One key difference with regard to consumer prices that emerges
from Fig. 5.3 is that the Bundesbank pushed headline CPI inflation from its 4.0 percent peak in 1992 to
almost zero, while the US Fed appears to have been careful enough to never even try to push inflation "below
2%." But even more striking, the minor rise in German headline CPI inflation over 1991-2 was largely due to
policy measures, a paradoxical phenomenon reflected by the core inflation measure22 in Fig. 5.3 Attempts at
fiscal consolidation, undertaken under Bundesbank pressure, led to significant rises in indirect taxes and
administered prices, in turn provoking even tighter money from the Bundesbank. Clearly, neither the economy
nor labor market participants are at fault when the authorities fail to grasp that the combination of
counterproductively tight fiscal and monetary policies might initially cause headline CPI inflation to rise, and
then to fall back only sluggishly. In short, the doubly-counterproductive policy mix even backfired on the
Bundesbank's primary goal of price stability (Bibow 1999).
Turning to wage inflation, Fig. 5.4 shows peaks at comparable levels for Germany and the US. And it seems
reasonable to presume that German wage inflation was pushed up over 1991-2 in line with headline CPI
inflation due to tax-push factors. Clearly, excessive wage rises were not an issue at any time after 1992,
when western German wage inflation remained even significantly below the US's. This itself is remarkable for
the fact that rises in tax and social security contribution rates involved falling  disposable real incomes for
large parts of the population over the 1990s. In the US, the Fed's easy money policy, embarked upon when
inflation was still above 3 percent, sparkled the strong investment boom of the 1990s that was going to yield
productivity increases sufficient to offset (relatively higher) US wage inflation, at falling  rates of CPI
inflation. 
In conclusion, the analysis here challenges the idea that Germany's stability-oriented policies of the 1990s
were in some sense "inevitable." Other policy options clearly existed, choosing wrong ones was anything but
inevitable. Nor were the real consequences of these policies inevitable in any sense. Crucially, this is not  to
suggest that the Bundesbank should have allowed run-away inflation. Very far from it. At the most critical
stage, a peculiar policy inconsistency--for which the Bundesbank more than anyone else bears
responsibility--pushed headline CPI inflation up, rather than down. Moreover, the crash landing  deliberately
engineered and followed by a decade of depressive fiscal and monetary policies was at the heart of the rise in
unemployment and Germany's fiscal paradox of the 1990s (including the sluggish headline CPI disinflation
after 1992). This is not the occasion to inquire into the Bundesbank's deeper motives or Germany's peculiar
institutional arrangements that allowed independent central bankers to become the dominant player in
economic policy making. Von Hagen (1992, p. 215) puts it succinctly though: "The Bundesbank gave a high
priority to credibility considerations and chose a tight stance without too much regard to the risk of
unnecessarily choking off the economic growth badly needed in the transition phase." As Domar (1944, p.
821, n. 43) cheerfully remarked: "It is very amusing that those who appear most worried about the burden of
the debt are usually least willing to advocate a lower interest rate on the debt!."
SOME HYPOTHETICAL GROWTH SCENARIOS AND THEIR ESTIMATED FISCAL IMPLICATIONS
The previous two sections have established that unsound macro policies were responsible for provoking the
protracted "anti-growth spread" that lies at the heart of the deterioration of German public finances after
1992. The objective of this section is to estimate the evolution of public finances under alternative,
hypothetical , growth scenarios. The chosen scenarios (a) and (b) modestly assume that a soft landing and
the subsequent continuance of 5 to 6 percent nominal GDP growth, respectively, were in fact feasible. The
former scenario corresponds to the mythical Maastricht parameter and West Germany's record over the
1980s, the latter is nearer to both the US's performance over the 1990s as well as West Germany's own
longer-term historical record.
Fig. 6.1 begins with estimating the most direct effect of higher growth on the evolution of the debt ratio.
Even without taking any other effect on public finances into account, but simply treating the absolute level of
debt actually accumulated until today as given, it is clear that today's debt ratio would be nearer to 50 or 55
rather than 60 percent. This factor alone thus illustrates well Domar's (1944) key message beautifully
summarized in his closing remark:
If all the people and organizations who work and study, write articles and make speeches, worry and spendsleepless nights - all because of fear of the debt - could forget about it for a while and spend even half their
efforts trying to find ways of achieving a growing national income, their contribution to the benefit and
welfare of humanity - and to the solution of the debt problem - would be immeasurable (Domar 1944, p. 823).
But higher GDP growth would have had effects other than simply making any given absolute level of debt more
bearable relative to some higher GDP level. In particular, higher GDP growth would have been quite naturally
accompanied by correspondingly higher tax revenues and lower government expenditure, most directly
attributable to the soaring unemployment in western (sic!) Germany. Commonly used estimates of tax and
expenditure elasticities for Germany would seem to imply that a one percent increase in GDP tends to reduce
the budget deficit by roughly one half of one percent of GDP (OECD 1999b). These flow effects of higher GDP
growth may be estimated on the basis of the sustainability analysis carried out in section 3 above in a number
of steps.
As a first step, Fig. 6.2 shows the path of hypothetical budget deficits based on the just-mentioned rule of
thumb that a one-percent shortfall of GDP growth increases the deficit by half a percent. In a second step,
these hypothetical budget deficits are then seen to be consistently smaller than the maximum stability
deficits that were calculated in Fig. 6.3 at 5 percent GDP growth. 
Finally, Fig. 6.4 shows that on the basis of these hypothetical budget deficits Germany's debt ratio would have
ended up closer to 50 rather than 60 percent by the late 1990s. These calculations confirm that a very
severe fiscal tightening (i.e. ex ante  deficit reduction) occurred since 1992. Alas, predictably, the untimely
and overly ambitious tightening failed to deliver the intended results.23
These estimates refer to total budget deficits. It is also worthwhile to focus more specifically on the interest
burden on the debt. The Bundesbank (1997, p. 23) refers to the "fact that a top-heavy interest rate-growth
rate differential is currently the prevailing pattern worldwide," estimating that this factor added about 7.5
percentage points to Germany's debt ratio over 1992-6 (see Table 6.1). Curiously, though, this is much less
of a "fact" than the Bundesbank makes it appear. Fig. 6.5 shows that (synchronized) growth spreads
collapsed severely in the wake of recession in both the US and Germany. The US managed to re-establish a
favorable growth spread in due course though, much in contrast to Germany. Fig. 6.6 shows that fairly
closely allied (10 year government) bond yields at starkly different speeds of growth were behind the marked
difference in growth spreads. 
The effects of the growth spread on the interest burden may be calculated in two steps. First, the change in
the debt ratio may be divided into the contributions due to the primary budget balance and to the
(growth-adjusted) interest burden on the stock of debt of the previous period:
d t = bb p
t + (i  - g )/(1 + g ) d t-1
As a second step, the evolution of Germany's public finances between 1992 and 1996 may then be
recalculated on the basis of the US's growth spread. Table 6.1 puts the pattern allegedly prevailing worldwide
into perspective: a non-negligible contribution of five percentage points to Germany's debt ratio can be most
directly attributed to the effects of the Bundesbank's long run of ultra-tight policies on the interest burden.
Recalculating the interest burden accumulated until the end of the decade shows that the gap even rose to
ten percentage points by the end of 2000. 
SO HOW HEAVY A FISCAL BURDEN DID UNIFICATION PUT ON GERMANY'S SHOULDERS?
According to the Bundesbank, "it can at least be said that more than half of the increase in the overall
indebtedness of the central, regional and local authorities since 1989 (totaling about DM 1,200 billion) is
attributable to reunification" (Bundesbank 1997, p. 19). Remarkably, treating "more than" DM 600 billion in
this way amounts to attributing almost the whole of the rise in Germany's debt ratio until the end of 1996 to
unification (in fact, "more than" 17 out of 19.3 percentage points; see Table 6.1). In the light of the above
analysis, this assertion appears to be well off the mark. A closer look at the Bundesbank's calculations and
assumptions thus seems in order here. 
Apart from attributing 7.5 percentage points (Table 6.1, column 4) to the interest burden, the Bundesbank
estimates that "inherited debts" have added some 12.6 percentage points (Table 6.1., column 5) toGermany's debt ratio between 1990 and 1996 (by the end of which the increase in the public debt due to
unification-related old debts had essentially run its course). The amount of inherited liabilities from the
German Democratic Republic (GDR) are put at "approximately DM 340 billion." This is the indebtedness of the
"Redemption Fund for Inherited Liabilities" which by 1997 had assumed the debts of the "Debt-Processing
Fund," "Treuhand Agency," east German housing enterprises, former GDR's social institutions, and
"equalization claims." If redemptions effected until 1997 are included and the prospective debts of the
"Indemnification Fund" added, the amount of properly inherited debts may be put at DM 365 billion. 
In addition, the Bundesbank (1997, p.19) asserts that the "indebtedness of the east German Länder
Governments and local authorities plus the new borrowing by the 'German Unity' Fund and the bulk of that by
the ERP Special Fund since 1990 can be ascribed unambiguously to reunification," additional borrowing of
some DM 235 billion. It is not clear at all though that the borrowing of these authorities should have pushed up
Germany's debt ratio. Borrowing by the east German Länder Governments and local authorities may have
simply established what are "normal" financial relations in West Germany and other developed economies.
Comparing the debts incurred by these authorities with the east German Länder GDP, it turns out that by
1996 their debt and interest expenditure ratios were below west German levels, as was their debt level per
inhabitant.24 
More importantly, it is rather unsafe to assume, as the Bundesbank seems to do, that lower deficit spending
would have left GDP unaffected, either its steady-state level or its actual path in the context of
restructuring eastern Germany's economy. Like the budget balance, the debt ratio can not be treated as an
exogenous variable, certainly not in "the short run" of a decade or so. In short, the question whether these
non-inherited debts due to current deficits pushed up Germany's debt ratio is far more complex than the
Bundesbank makes it appear. Given that the aspired policy goal was for former East Germany to catch up to
the West, it may well turn out that too little rather than too much deficit spending was undertaken by these
authorities. 
As regards borrowing by the German Unity Fund, it should be noted here that the transfers financed by the
Fund's borrowing were already included in net transfers and their effects on Germany's public finance position
in sections 2 and 3 above. To avoid double-counting, the German Unity Fund's borrowing cannot be considered
as an stock-adjustment factor here as well.25 Borrowing by the ERP Special Fund of some DM 27 billion after
1989 is especially interesting. Given that the ERP Fund's borrowing served mainly to finance low-interest
loans to the east German economy, another facet of the above-mentioned policy inconsistency emerges here.
On the one hand, the monetary authority pushes up interest rates to engineer a "stabilization crisis." On the
other hand, the fiscal authority tries to assure that the investment desperately needed for growth and
reconstruction of eastern Germany's economy does not collapse under the mounting burden of financing
costs.26 The consequences of stability-oriented monetary policies for public finances are rather clear-cut. To
classify the borrowing of the ERP Fund as "unification-related" misses the point. 
It seems to me that a more accurate picture of the fiscal "burden" of unification may be obtained by directly
focusing on net fiscal transfer flows on the one hand, and stock adjustments due to inherited debts on the
other. The former has to be seen in relation to western German GDP, the latter relative to All-German GDP.
Table 7.1 illustrates the evolution of these two ratios under actual and hypothetical growth scenarios of 5
and 6 percent respectively. 
The fiscal burden of current transfers would have shrunk to roughly 3.5 percent by the end of the decade.
Recall that (net) transfers are estimated in a way that takes only partial account of the self-financing
effects of deficit spending. Furthermore, higher growth in the West could hardly have failed to raise growth
in the East as well, thereby reducing the volume of transfers required. 
Stock adjustments due to inherited debts would have pushed up the debt ratio by roughly 8 percentage points
or a third of its actual rise, if economic policies had allowed a more benign growth scenario. This would have
raised the interest burden on the debt by roughly 0.5 percent of GDP. 
To be sure, taken together the fiscal implications of these two clearly unification-related factors confirm
that unification posed a huge fiscal challenge. In view of the fact that the budgetary position attained before
unification was such as to allow significant tax cuts  (at the 40 percent debt ratio established at the time),the price Germany had to pay as an investment for getting its own unified future on track and keeping it
there was clearly non-negligible. Some degree of fiscal consolidation would have been required at some point if
the debt ratio had been stabilized at, say, 50 percent (assuming that any rise due to inherited debts plus
some slippage was unavoidable in anything but the long term). But this "price" was raised out of all
proportions by the policies chosen to cope with this historical challenge and responsibility. An enormous
opportunity was missed and the actual fiscal tightening of the 1990s was far in excess of any proper
"burden" of unification. 
The crucial point to note here is that the debt ratio rose further than necessary exactly because ill-guided
attempts were applied to keeping it too low. Similarly, the actual fiscal tightening undertaken without
achieving the aspired goal of keeping the debt ratio from rising ever higher turned out excessive exactly
because fiscal policy was ill-timed and inexplicably ambitious, all too desperate at trying to catch up with the
fiscal implications that poor growth in western Germany inflicted on the budget, and all along accompanied by
counterproductively tight monetary policies. 
There is thus a clear explanation for Germany's fiscal paradox of the 1990s. In addition to unification-related
transfers (mass unemployment in the East, in particular), Germany also had to put up with the fiscal
consequences of sluggish growth and roughly 1.5 million job losses in the West. Given the disparity between
East and West in relative economic size and income levels, the extra burden deliberately or carelessly
provoked in the West was even heavier than what had to be shouldered in the East at any rate. And there can
be no doubt that more favorable developments in the West would have proved beneficial for the
transformation of the East too.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
This paper challenges the view that the drastic deterioration in Germany's public finances and western
Germany's exceptionally poor performance over the 1990s are attributable to unification, representing a kind
of "burden" of unification. In particular, the analysis denies what must be the key - defeatist - postulate of
the conventional wisdom, namely, that Germany's dismal performance was in some sense "inevitable." Rather,
it is shown that thoroughly unsound macro demand policies were pursued in response to unification, policies
that were in conflict with both economic theory and the sound practices of other more successful countries.
The analysis in this paper merely presumes that fiscal and monetary policies could, in principle, be conducted
more intelligently in Germany too. 
In this regard, the initial unification-related sharp rise in deficit spending in 1990-1991 stands out as the one
aspect of fiscal policy that was both quite inevitable and not  out of line with economic theory. What Mr.
Waigel must be blamed for is that he failed to lay out and promote, at an early stage, any  credible
medium-term financing plan, unnecessarily causing uncertainties. But the key fiscal mistake only occurred
when an ill-timed and overly ambitious consolidation plan was embarked upon in 1992. Mr Waigel predictably
failed to retain public finances under control once his policies had destabilized western Germany (hitting back
on the budget with a severe vengeance). 
But occurrences in Germany over the 1990s cannot be properly understood without paying due tribute to the
pivotal and fateful role of the Bundesbank. The long run of excessively tight monetary policy orchestrated by
the Bundesbank between 1990 and 1995 truly magnified the counterproductive effects of poorly conducted
fiscal policies. And this was far from all. To anyone familiar with the realities of economic policy making in
Germany it is quite clear that the role of the Bundesbank went far beyond the conduct of poor monetary
policies. Effectively, the Bundesbank was in charge of macro demand policies, rather than just monetary
policy. Nonetheless, in any democracy, presumably, ultimate responsibility for the outcomes of economic
policies always rests with the democratically-elected representatives, the government of Helmut Kohl and its
notoriously unsuccessful Finance Minister Theo Waigel. It represents a barely aspiring peculiarity of German
democratic traditions and institutions that those actually in charge  not only lacked any democratic
legitimacy, but cannot be held to account for their performance either. 
Mr Tietmeyer's span at the Bundesbank's helm from 1993 to 1998 thus stands out as the period of
Germany's by far worst economic performance on record. Yet when Mr Tietmeyer left office in the summer
of 1999, Germany's conservative media (firmly under Bundesbank spell!) praised him as the best Bundesbank
President ever, grading him as a "first" (equal to Germany's headline CPI inflation of one percent at thetime).27 This would seem to prove that maximizing the personal prestige of an independent central banker
might come at a high price to society at large. It represents something of a tragedy though that the happiest
political event in Germany's post WWII history provoked its most burdensome economic policy disaster. 
Curiously, the thoroughly unsound fiscal and monetary policies of the 1990s caused  many of those
structural problems the Germany of today is famous for. Paradoxically, the Bundesbank's deflationary
policies even proved inflationary  at the most critical stage. Ironically, the overall fiscal tightening and
deterioration of Germany's public finances that occurred over the 1990s was far in excess  of what would
have been strictly required to cope with the challenges and responsibilities posed by unification. A great
opportunity was missed, and Germany (and Europe) paid a dear price for a policy experiment based on
doctrines and beliefs the relation of which to economic theory is anything but clear. In the very least, those
who fallaciously hold that the stability-oriented crusade of the 1990s represented the best policy option
available should expressly face up to the gigantic real costs deliberately caused by their preferred policies.
The results of the Great German Deflation of the 1990s should not be blamed on unification. For these dismal
outcomes do not  represent any burden of unification, but the economic consequences of Messrs Waigel and
Tietmeyer. 
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GDP employment unemploy-ment rate public sector 
























1980 1472.0 6.0 1.0 26980 1.5 3.2 -2.9 31.7 48.9 42.6
1981 1535.0 4.3 0.1 26951 -0.1 4.5 -3.7 35.4 49.7 42.5
1982 1588.1 3.5 -0.4 26630 -1.2 6.4 -3.3 38.7 50.0 42.7
1983 1668.5 5.1 1.8 26251 -1.4 7.9 -2.5 39.1 48.7 42.1
1984 1750.9 4.9 2.8 26293 0.2 7.9 -1.9 40.1 48.1 42.2
1985 1823.2 4.1 2.0 26489 0.7 8.0 -1.1 41.6 47.7 42.5
1986 1925.3 5.6 2.3 26856 1.4 7.6 -1.3 41.5 47.1 41.8
1987 1990.5 3.4 1.5 27050 0.7 7.6 -1.8 42.2 47.4 42.0
1988 2096.0 5.3 3.7 27261 0.8 7.6 -2.1 42.2 47.0 41.7
1989 2224.4 6.1 3.6 27658 1.5 6.8 0.1 39.9 45.3 41.9
1990 2426.0 9.1 5.0 28479 2.6 6.2 -2.0 42.0 45.8 40.3
Sources: Statistiches Bundesamt.
Table 2.2. Some Key Facts about Germany's Economic Performance Over the 1990s







































iD Cg Ig Tr
1990 2426.0 9.1 5.0 28479 6.2 45 1.9 n.a. -49.7 -2.0 43.8 -- -- -- --
1991 2647.6 9.1 5.0 29189 5.5 106 4.0 2938.0 -85.20 -2.9 41.5 2.8 19.2 2.7 15.7
1992 2813.0 6.2 1.8 29457 5.8 114 4.1 3155.2 -78.9 -2.5 44.1 3.3 19.8 2.9 16.3
1993 2840.5 1 -2.0 29002 7.3 128 4.5 3235.4 -103.5 -3.2 47.1 3.4 19.9 2.8 17.4
1994 2962.1 4.3 2.1 28656 8.3 126 4.3 3394.4 -84.9 -2.5 49.4 3.3 19.7 2.7 17.7
1995 3049.8 3 0.9 28464 8.4 140 4.6 3523.0 -112.7 -3.2 57.1 3.7 19.8 2.3 18.1
1996 3112.3 2 1.1 28156 9.1 140 4.5 3586.5 -121.9 -3.4 59.8 3.7 19.9 2.1 19.3
1997 3202.6 2.9 2.3 27884 9.9 136 4.2 3666.5 -95.3 -2.6 60.9 3.6 19.5 1.9 19.3
1998 3329.0 3.9 2.7 27915 9.4 141 4.2 3784.4 -64.3 -1.7 60.7 3.6 19.1 1.8 18.9
1999 3402.5 2.3* 1.4* n.a. 8.8 144p 4.2 3877.2 -42.6 -1.1 61.0 3.5 19.0 1.8 18.9
Sources. Statistisches Bundesamt, Deutsche Bundesbank (1997), Federal Finance Ministry.
Notes: West German data (GDP, employment and unemployment) for 1990-98 based on ESA 1979 national accounting conventions, estimates for
1999. All-German data based on ESA 1995. Net fiscal transfers as estimated by Federal Finance Ministry.
1 Maastricht definition
* Estimates
p Planned Table 3.1. 
Sustainability of German Public Finances with Reference to Total Budget Balances, 1988-2000 
  d 1 g def -gd Differenc
(3) - (4)
































1988 42.2 5.3 -2.1 -2.24 0.14 -3.18 1.08
1989 39.9 6.1 0.1 -2.43 2.53 -3.66 3.76
1990 43.8 9.1 -2 -3.99 1.99 -5.46 3.46
1991 41.5 9.1 -2.9 -3.78 0.88 -5.46 2.56
1992 44.1 7.4 -2.5 -3.26 0.76 -4.44 1.94
1993 47.1 2.5 -3.2 -1.18 -2.02 -1.5 -1.7
1994 49.4 4.9 -2.5 -2.42 -0.08 -2.94 0.44
1995 57.1 3.8 -3.2 -2.17 -1.03 -2.28 -0.92
1996 59.8 1.8 -3.4 -1.08 -2.32 -1.08 -2.32
1997 60.9 2.2 -2.6 -1.34 -1.26 -1.32 -1.28
1998 60.7 3.2 -1.7 -1.94 0.24 -0.92 0.22
1999 61.0 2.5 -1.1 -1.53 0.43 -1.50 0.4
2000 61.1 3.5 -1.2 -2.14 0.94 -2.10 0.9
Sources: OECD (2000).
1 From 1990 onwards Maastricht definition of gross public debt (OECD Annex Table 61). Table 3.2. 
Sustainability of German Public Finances with Reference to Primary Balances, 1988-2000


































1988 42.2 6.6 5.3 1.3 0.2 0.55 -0.35
1989 39.9 7.1 6.1 1 2.2 0.4 1.8
1990 43.8 8.7 9.1 -0.4 -0.1 -0.18 0.08
1991 41.5 8.5 9.1 -0.6 -0.7 -0.25 -0.45
1992 44.1 7.9 7.4 0.5 0.1 0.22 -0.12
1993 47.1 6.5 2.5 4 -0.5 1.88 -2.38
1994 49.4 6.9 4.9 2 0.2 0.99 -0.79
1995 57.1 6.9 3.8 3.1 -0.1 1.77 -1.87
1996 59.8 6.2 1.8 4.4 -0.3 2.63 -2.93
1997 60.9 5.7 2.2 3.5 0.5 2.13 -1.63
1998 60.7 4.6 3.2 1.4 1.4 0.85 0.55
1999 61.0 4.5 2.5 2 2.0 1.22 0.78
2000 61.1 5.8 3.5 2.3 1.8 1.41 0.39
Sources. OECD (2000).

















Of which the Bundesbank (1997)
attributes to
Alternative hypothetical scenario


































1991 41.1       1.0      
1992 43.7 2.6 0.3 0.3 2.1 0.6 7.0 5.6
1993 47.8 4.1 0.9 2.0 0.3 0.3 5.9 5.1
1994 50.1 2.3 -0.3 1.1 2.0 0.4 7.1 6.2
1995 57.7 7.7 -0.5 1.8 6.8 0.9 6.6 4.6
1996 60.3 2.6 -0.3 2.3 0.4 0.4 6.4 5.6
1992
-1996
-- 19.3 0.1 7.5 12.6 2.6 -- --
1997 60.9 0.6 0.5 2.0 -- 0.1 6.4 6.2
1998 60.7 -0.2 1.4 0.8 -- -0.1 5.3 5.5
1999 61.0 0.3 2.0 1.2 -- -0.1 5.6 5.7
2000 61.1 0.1 1.8 1.4 -- -0.3 6.6 7.1
1999-2000 -- 20.1 5.8 12.9 -- 2.2 -- --
Sources. OECD (2000), Deutsche Bundesbank (1997, p. 24). 
Note: For reasons of comparability the figures stated in columns (1) to (5) for the years 1991 to 1996 are the original ones the
Bundesbank used in its calculation in 1997 (except for the one percentage point attributed to debt assumptions in 1991 that actually
arose over 1990-1991). By contrast, columns (1) to (5) for the years 1997 to 2000 as well as columns (6) to (8) are based on
OECD (2000) data.Table 7.1. Estimating the Fiscal "Burden" of Unification






























1991 2647.6 106 4.0 2647.6 4 2647.6 4
1992 2813.0 114 2780.5 2780.0 4.1 2806.5 4.1
1993 2840.5 128 2909.1 2919 4.4 2974.9 4.3
1994 2962.1 126 3073.2 3065 4.1 3153.4 4
1995 3049.8 140 3181.8 3218.3 4.4 3342.6 4.2
1996 3112.3 140 3414.6 3379.2 4.1 3543.2 4
1997 3202.6 136 3578.9 3548.2 3.8 3755.8 3.6
1998 3329.0 141 3710.5 3725.6 3.8 3981.1 3.5
1999 3402.5 144p 3891.9 3911.9 3.7 4220 3.4
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt, German Federal Finance Ministry.
Notes: Transfer ratios refer to western German GDP (based on ESA 79 national accounting conventions) while contribution of inherited
debts to rise in debt ratio refer to All-German GDP (based on ESVG 1995 national accounting conventions).
w denotes western Germany












1. Publications by the Bundesbank and the Sachverständigenrat ([SVR] German Council of Economic Experts)
would seem to suggest that these authorities were surprised by western Germany's supply-side elasticity and
benign price developments. See e.g. SVR Annual Report 1990-1, Art. 156; SVR Annual Report 1991-2, Art.
120; Deutsche Bundesbank, Annual Report 1990, p. 19.2. It is a gross misjudgement to compare West German inflation of 1986 with All-German inflation of 1992
and conclude that a major inflation outburst occurred in between. For one thing, taking 1986-7 as the base
fails to distinguish price level effects due to the oil price shock of 1986 from inflation proper. For another,
as the Bundesbank (1991) made clear at an early point, adjustments in relative prices in eastern Germany in
the early nineties should not be interpreted as inflation either. West German inflation peaked in 1992 at 4.0
percent, and even the minor rise above the previous 2.5 percent inflation trend was to a very large extent
not market determined. 
3. And as Germany's wise men correctly observed in their 1990-91 Annual Report (Art. 158): "high interest
rates contributed significantly to the increase in unit costs this year." 
4. As is evident from its publications and public statements the Bundesbank wielded its enormous powers and
put increasing pressure on the government to prevent financing unification through borrowing right from the
start (cf. Akerlof et. al. 1991, Owen Smith 1994). In the early years, moreover, the Bundesbank's forecasts
of budget deficits were consistently (and conspicuously) on the high side (cf. Von Hagen 1994). Kloten (1997)
offers some insights into the thinking behind the Bundesbank's position. 
5. It has by now become conventional wisdom to justify the Bundesbank's highly contractionary policy stance
of the early 1990s "largely as a reaction to the inflationary consequences of the way unification was
financed" (OECD 1999, p. 26). It is therefore important to note that the rise in headline CPI inflation was
caused by measures intended to prevent public borrowing rather than by deficit spending itself; as
market-determined price trends at the time barely increased at all. 
6. Giersch et al. (1992, p. 262) observed that: "In comparison to West Germany, with its well-established and
advanced market economy, East Germany was rather small (26.5 per cent in terms of population, roughly 10
per cent in terms of GDP ...). Hence, regardless of the details of the policies adopted, German unification
meant from the outset that the pains of political and economic transformation in the East were to become
mere regional problems of a much larger unit whose overall stability would be only marginally affected by
whatever difficulties the switch to a market economy in the eastern part would entail." If one agrees with this
judgement one must be struck by the fact that Germany's stability turned out to be rather more than only
marginally affected. 
7. One estimate puts this factor in the order of magnitude of some DM 50 billion per annum (see Heilemann
and Jochimsen 1993, p. 24, table 4; Heilemann and Reinicke 1995, p. 100, fn. 5). Additional fiscal savings
arose as expenditures previously incurred due to the division of Germany fell away gradually after unification.
8. Germany's wise men put the figure at DM 38 billion for the year 1990 (see SVR1990-91, p. 142).
9. These were estimated to have added some 1.5 to 2 percent to GDP growth in both 1990 and 1991. 
10. Initially, pressures were purely internal ones arising from the Bundesbank's belief that unification must
not be financed by borrowing. The "convergence criteria" hammered out in the Maastricht negotiations of
1991 then apparently provided an additional external constraint. Yet, the Treaty reflected largely German
demands on the requirements for "stability," and was heavily influenced by the "Bundesbank view."
11. In spring 1997, the Bundesbank judged the trend of Germany's debt ratio since unification as
"unsustainable over the long term" (Bundesbank 1997, p. 23), thoroughly misjudging the true underlying
causes of these developments though. In 1998-99, when international crises seemed to be cutting off the
last economic lifeline Germany was clinging to all along, namely exports, Germany was even flirting with
economic disaster.
12. Domar referred to the possibility that a government might actually succeed in paying down part of the
debt: "They recognize no other method of achieving their goal but by reducing the absolute size of the debt;
that the government must stop borrowing is of course taken for granted. They should beware, however, lest
the policies they advocate exert such a depressing effect on the national income as to result in an actually
heavier debt burden, even though they succeed in paying off a part of the debt" (Domar 1944, p. 815-6). In
the more general case discussed here, the attempt to reduce the debt ratio  actually pushes it up. In eithercase, the problem and apparent paradox is that the tax burden rises rather than falls, despite (or because
of?) desperate measures to prevent this. 
13. This is noteworthy for the fact that US's fiscal conduct was in stark conflict with the "Growth and
Stability Pact" [SGP] that forms part of the stability-oriented macroeconomic policy framework of the euro
zone (cf. Arestis, McCauley and Sayers 1999, Eichengreen 1996, Eichengreen and Wyplosz 1998). According
to SGP rules, the US would have been penalized for its irresponsible policies. The SGP was proposed in 1995
by the German Finance Minister Theo Waigel. Rumor has it though that the Pact was masterminded by the
Bundesbank.
14. It is currently fashionable to believe that independent central bankers differ from democratically-elected
politicians in some important ways, and this is held to justify that they should have long and very secure
contracts (i.e. operate in a highly inflexible labor market segment). In view of the facts shown in fig. 4.1., it
seems rather remarkable that, on January 26, 2000, Otmar Issing, the ECB's chief economist who previously
held the same position at the Bundesbank between 1990 and 1998, praised the UK as a role model of fiscal
prudence, stating that he would welcome Britain joining the euro-zone as this would "add to peer pressure for
sound fiscal policy" (reported in the Financial Times of January 27,2000). Of course, I have no problem with
judging Britain's fiscal policies over the 1990s as "sound." The point is that it was largely due to pressures
from Mr Issing's former employer that Germany conducted fiscal policies from 1992 onwards that were in
stark contrast to those of the UK. Apparently, then, central bank politicians may suffer from the same kind
of weaknesses generally attributed to their democratically-elected counterparts, such as lack of memory, or
flimsy knowledge of the facts etc. 
15. Vittas (1995, pp. 5) observes that the impact of the fiscal adjustment in 1992-93 coincided with
"powerful offsetting effects of automatic stabilizers" and also refers to the risks that Germany's attempts
to comply with the Maastricht fiscal convergence criteria might depress its production potential  over the
medium term. Of course depressing actual  production over successive "short-runs" does have such
longer-term consequences too. 
16. The wise men's calculations are based on "financial statistics." These show a small deficit for the year
1989, thus starting from a lower level. But otherwise the overall picture is the same as the one based on
national accounts. A key difference between these statistics is that credits and income from investments
are considered expenditures in the financial statistics, but savings in the national accounts. Cf. Horn and
Scheremet 1999. 
17. It is sometimes argued that there are also so-called non-Keynesian effects involved in fiscal consolidation
that might partly compensate or even overturn the negative Keynesian effects in the short run . These
arguments refer to risk premia on public bonds and confidence effects in cases of very large fiscal
imbalances. The experiences of Denmark (1983-6) and Ireland ( 1987-9) are usually seen as proof of this
possibility (cf. Bertola and Drazen 1993, Giavazzi and Pagano 1990). Yet it is not clear a priori why these
special considerations and small-country experiences should be of any  relevance to Germany since 1992. Ex
post it is very clear that the Keynesian effects dominated whatever non-Keynesian effects might have played
any role in the example under discussion here. 
18. Not surprisingly, having successfully depressed the economy, the sustainable level of interest rates then
remained significantly below US rates for the rest of the decade - the story of the euro's plunge (cf. Bibow
2001).
19. A fact which never stopped Bundesbank President Hans Tietmeyer from outright rejecting James Tobin's
(see FAZ 1996) accusal that the Bundesbank's one-sided preoccupation with inflation caused sluggish growth
and unemployment. In an interview in 1999, Professor Tietmeyer went even further and asserted that the
Bundesbank's stability-oriented policies were conducive to growth and employment in Germany (see Herz
1999); which would seem to imply that with less deflationary policies Germany's unemployment scandal over
the 1990s would have been even more serious. The point is that in Germany Bundesbank proclamations are
widely believed no matter how far out of touch with economic theory they may be. Their influence on public
opinion can hardly be overestimated. 
20. A monetary conditions index (MCI) combines two indicators of monetary stance, a short-term interestrate and the effective (i.e. trade-weighted) exchange rate, the two factors being weighted according to their
relative role in the transmission mechanism in their effects on aggregate demand and activity. The absolute
value of the MCI does not represent a measure of monetary stance though. The MCI merely indicates whether
stance has become more or less restrictive relative to some base. The base here is the 1st quarter of 1990.
Other inputs are, first, the Frankfurt overnight interest rate deflated at the (western) German CPI and,
second, the effective exchange rate vis a vis 18 industrial countries and based on the deflator for total
expenditure, with a 3:1 weighting. This means that a one percentage point increase in real interest rates or a
three percent appreciation of the real effective exchange rate (REER) are being treated as having equivalent
effects on aggregate demand. 
21. The output gap measure used here is due to the German Council of Economic Experts which has the
advantage of concentrating on western Germany's production potential as derived from the rate of utilization
of the economy's capital stock. The data for 1985-1998 are from the Annual Report 1998-99 (p. 285, table
A1). For 1999 I used an own estimate as the wise men's measure for western Germany was discontinued in
1999.
22. The measure of core inflation and "tax-push inflation" of Fig. 5.4. is based on calculations due to Weeber
(1993, 1994, 1997, 1998), providing the most comprehensive index of this kind available for western
Germany between 1992-8. (Data for 1991 is based on the German wise men's calculations.) And this still
leaves cost pressures arising from rising social security contributions out of the picture. According to the
Bundesbank, indirect taxes added about 0.5 percentage points to headline CPI inflation in 1991, implying that
core inflation remained roughly stable from the years before. Heilemann and Jochimsen (1993, p. 29) argue
that in 1992 "administrative price hikes caused a 1 percent increase in inflation, which gave wage claims an
additional push of 0.5 to 0.7 percent." Heilemann and Reinicke (1995, p. 12) observe that "the increase in
government-administered prices and social security contributions to finance unification led - along with
increased housing rents - to a rise in inflation from less than 2.5 percent prior to unification to an average of
3.5 percent between 1990-1993."
23. Heilemann and Reinicke (1995, p. 83) observed that "the deficit reduction currently projected in the
government's medium-term financial plan is exceptionally swift and intense relative to Germany's own past
experience as well as to international standards," warning of the likely macroeconomic repercussions. 
24. By the end of 1996, the east German Länder Governments and Local authorities had incurred DM 141
billion, while their GDP (including east Berlin) stood at DM 413 billion (SVR 1998-9, p. 341).
25. The Bundesbank (1997, p. 22) puts the German Unity Fund's borrowing to finance general transfers to
the east German Lander Government until the end of 1994 at DM 95 billion from which it deducts DM 11 billion
for redemptions effected until 1997. The statistics of the German Finance Ministry show transfers made by
the German Unity Fund from 1991 to its end in 1994 at DM 75 billion, a figure that includes all credit-financed
transfers but not subsidies by the Federal and western Lander Governments. The difference of DM 20 billion
over a period of four years seems small enough to be ignored here.
26. By 1996, Germany's GDP was DM 3524 billion (on the basis of the old ESA 1979 conventions), 12.6 per
cent of which are equal to DM 444 billion. Most curiously, in attributing about 12.6 percentage points of
Germany's debt ratio of 1996 to assumed debts, the Bundesbank seems to have treated only the debts
incurred by the German Unity Fund of DM 95 billion, but not  those incurred by the ERP Special Fund of DM 27
billion, like inherited debts. Adding the latter's borrowing as well would have left the margin too small in view
of the 7.5 percentage points the Bundesbank decided to attribute to the interest burden; one may venture
here. 
27. Cf. Deutsche Bundesbank 1999). This surely reflects a peculiar form of money illusion widespread in
Germany, or "the Bundesbank myth." As a thought experiment the reader may ask herself whether Alan
Greenspan would have ever gained any prestige in the United States if, starting from 3 percent inflation, a
prolonged deflationary crusade had first pushed up inflation before crunching it out of the economy
completely, at a doubling unemployment rate and real GDP growth averaging less than 1.5 percent for the
better part of a decade.